AIDS-CONFIDENTIALITY-INDIVIDUALS INFECTED WITH ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) THROUGH BLOOD
TRANSFUSIONS MAY OBTAIN LIMITED DISCLOSURE OF DONOR'S
IDENTITY DURING PRETRIAL DISCOVERY-Snyder v. Mekhjian,

125 NJ. 328, 593 A.2d 318 (1991).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the detection of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)' in 1981,2 AIDS-related problems have presented
novel issues in our nation's courts.3 One such issue originates
I Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is defined as "the occurrence
of a variety of specific infections and/or malignancies which take advantage of acquired defects in the immune system, now known to be caused by a virus named
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV-1) (formerly called Human T Cell Lymphotropic Virus III (HTLV III))." Allan Gibofsky & Jeffrey C. Laurence, AIDS: Current
Medical and Scientific Aspects, 9J. LEGAL MED. 497, 497 (1988).
To fully appreciate the complexity of the legal issues involved in a case such as
Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 NJ. 328, 593 A.2d 318 (1991) (per curiam), it is essential
to have some understanding of AIDS and how it operates. AIDS is the term given
to various health problems caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),
which destroys a person's natural immune system. Sharon L. Dieringer, Comment,
Blood Donation:A Gift of Life or a Death Sentence?, 22 AKRON L. REV. 623, 624 (1989).
An individual's immune system is situated in white blood cells called lymphocytes.
Id. Lymphocytes are comprised of T-cells and B-cells, the white blood cells that
together generate the antibody protein that detects and destroys disease-causing
organisms. Id. HIV viral infection results in a gradual destruction of T-4 helper
cells, which are necessary for proper immunological response. Id. This crippling
effect increases the vulnerability of HIV-positive individuals to many infections or
malignancies, which are referred to as opportunistic diseases. Id. Normally, opportunistic diseases such as pneumocystis crinii pneumonia and Kaposi's sarcoma are
not a real threat to an individual's health. Id. These opportunistic diseases, however, become more significant to the HIV-positive person whose immune system
progressively weakens. Id.
The fatal phase of the disease is diagnosed as AIDS. Id. at 625. At this stage,
opportunistic diseases have overwhelmed a person's depressed immune system. Id.
These diseases ravage the body and eventually cause the individual's death. Id. at
624. The life expectancy of an individual diagnosed with AIDS is approximately
one year. Id. at 625. Ninety percent of those individuals who acquire AIDS die
within two years. Id. Currently, there is no known cure or vaccine for the disease.
Snyder, 125 N.J. at 331, 593 A.2d at 319. Hence, the number of individuals ultimately to be infected is incalculable. See id.
2 Miriam G. Waltzer, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and Infection with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, 36 LoYoLA L. REV. 55, 56 (1990). Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), now frequently referred to as Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV), was recognized in the United States in 1981 after first being detected
in Central Africa (Zaire and Uganda). Id.
3 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 904
(D.V.I. 1991) (compelling defendant to undergo a blood test to determine whether
alleged rape victim was exposed to the HIV virus did not violate Fourth Amendment restraints on unreasonable searches); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234,
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when an individual contends to have contracted the HIV virus,
the cause of AIDS, through a blood transfusion.4 In this situation, the blood recipient may sue the blood bank that supplied
the contaminated blood.5 Proving the causation element often
1243 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (mandatory segregation of HIV-positive prisoners revealed
their medical condition and thereby violated their constitutional privacy rights);
JohnettaJ. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 685 (1990) (a state statute which
permitted HIV virus testing of persons who bit public safety employees did not
violate Fourth Amendment restrictions on unreasonable searches); Phipps v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist., 251 Cal. Rptr. 720, 724 (1988) (affirming the
issuance of a permanent injunction requiring a school district to allow an HIVpositive student to attend school); State v. Mercer, 544 A.2d 611, 618 (Conn. 1988)
(holding that a criminal defendant was not deprived of a fair trial because the trial
court informed prospective jurors prior to voir dire that the defendant was suffering from AIDS); R.E.G. v. L.M.G., 571 N.E.2d 298, 305-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (it
is inappropriate to divide marital property unequally in favor of the wife based
upon a risk that the wife may have been infected with the HIV virus by the husband); Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (evidence of a
father's infection with the HIV virus was inadequate to support complete termination of visitation rights); Guardianship of Anthony, 524 N.E.2d 1361, 1363-64
(Mass. 1988) (determining that a probate court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering medical staff at a school for the mentally retarded to conduct HIV testing on
residents alleged to be sexual partners); New York State School Bds. Ass'n. v. Sobol, 570 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717-18 (App. Div. 1991) (a state statute which required representatives from religious groups to be included on AIDS advisory boards did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); Brunner v. Al Attar, 786
S.W.2d 784, 785-86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (discharging an at-will employee who
refused to discontinue volunteer work with an AIDS group was not improper).
4 See infra note 139 (discussing the outcome in courts which have confronted
pretrial discovery issues during blood transfusion-related AIDS litigation).
5 See generally Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of
AIDS: Legislative Options, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 202-03 (1990) (discussing disclosure of HIV-positive blood donor identities in connection with transfusion-related
AIDS litigation and the blood supply system). There are numerous statutes pertaining to the liability of blood banks and other blood suppliers. Generally, these
statutes restrict an individual to a negligence action while eliminating the possibility
to sue on strict liability or breach of warranty theories. States that have enacted
such statutes include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (1984); Alaska, ALASKA
STAT. § 45.02.316(e) (1986); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (1986); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-802 (Michie 1987); California, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1990); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104(2)
(West 1989); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1986); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (1975); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 672.316(5) (West Supp. 1991); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-28 (Michie 1982);
Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-91 (1985); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (Supp.
1991); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, para. 5102 (Smith-Hurd 1988); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1985); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.125
(Michie 1991); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2797 (West 1991); Maine, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (West Supp. 1990); Maryland, MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 18-402 (1990); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2316(5) (West 1990); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.9121(2) (West
1980); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.928 (West 1975); Mississippi, Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-41-1 (1981); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (Vernon Supp.
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necessitates discovering the identity of the individual who
donated the contaminated blood.6 Pursuant to discovery sections of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' or parallel state
procedural rules, 8 the blood recipient can move to acquire this
information. 9 A court confronted with such a motion will have to
1991); Montana, MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-33-102 to -104 (1991); Nebraska, NEB.
§ 71-4001 (1990); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.010 (Michie
1986); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(3)(d) (1983); Ohio, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Anderson 1990); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 2151 (West 1984); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 97.300 (1989); Pennsylvania, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8333 (1982); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17-30 (1989);
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); South Dakota,
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (1988); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-2-316(5) (1979); Texas, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 77.003 (West
1986); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-31-1 (1989); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1297 (Michie 1985); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West 1975);
West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 16-23-1 (1985); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.31(2) (West 1989); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 35-5-110 (1977).
6 See Boutte v. Blood Systems, Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D. La. 1989) (discovery relating to blood donor was necessary to ascertain whether blood screening
procedures were adhered to in support of the claim); Belle Bonfiles Memorial
Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1013 (Colo. 1988) (holding it is necessary for the plaintiff to gain information from the blood donor to prosecute claim);
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (ordering discovery from blood donor to learn whether donor screening safeguards
were performed by blood bank), appeal granted, 577 A.2d 890 (1990).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
8 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1984) ("Most states ...
have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016 to 2036 (West
1983); Ky. R. CIv. P. 26.01-37.04; PA. R. CIv. P. 4003.1-4012; VT. R. CIv. P. 26-37.
See infra note 37 (stating that the New Jersey rule covering scope of discovery contains the same text as the federal rule).
9 See Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 5, at 163-73. In part because most states
have enacted statutes which provide for the confidentiality of medical records pertaining to contagious diseases, sexually transmitted diseases, or AIDS patients,
blood-gathering organizations will oppose releasing information concerning the
blood donor's identity. Id. These states include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 22-1 1A-54
(Supp. 1991); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-664 (Supp. 1991); Arkansas,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-904 (Michie Supp. 1991); California, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 199.20 (West 1990); Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-41404(3) (West Supp. 1991); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-583 (West
Supp. 1991); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203 (Supp. 1990); Florida, FIA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 381.609(3)(d), (f), (g) (West Supp. 1991); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-9-40.1 (Michie Supp. 1991); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101 (Supp. 1990);
Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-606, 39-610 (Supp. 1991); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
111 1/2, para. 7309 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.57 (West 1992); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. §§ 141.10, 141.23 (West 1989 & Supp.
1991); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6003, 65-6004 (Supp. 1990); Kentucky, Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.420 (Michie 1991); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1062.1(C), 1065(A) (West Supp. 1992); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1032 (West 1980); Maryland, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-338.1 (h) (Supp.
1991); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70F (West Supp. 1991);
REV. STAT.
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consider statutory limitations, general public policy concerns and
constitutional privacy rights in making its decision.' 0
Recently, in Snyder v. Mekhjian," the New Jersey Supreme
Court determined whether a medical patient who receives HIVpositive blood from a transfusion could acquire limited discovery
of the donor's identity in a negligence suit against the blood
bank.' 2 Specifically, the court considered whether section 26:5C9(a) of the AIDS Assistance Act of New Jersey, 1 3 which allows
disclosure in narrow circumstances, applied and whether it in§ 333.5131 (West Supp. 1991); Minnesota,
1989); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.656
(Vernon Supp. 1992); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1009 (1991); Nebraska,
NEB. REV. STAT. 71-503.01 (Supp. 1991); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441A.220
(Michie_1991); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-F:8 (1990); New
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-7 (West Supp. 1991); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-2B-6 (Michie Supp. 1991); New York, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2782 (McKinney Supp. 1992); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-143 (1989); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07-02.2 (1991); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.243 (Anderson Supp. 1990); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.2
(West Supp. 1992); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7607 (Supp. 1991);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-6-17 (1991); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-29-135 (Law. Co-op. 1985); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A35B-5 (Supp. 1991); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-10-113 (Supp. 1991);
Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103 (West Supp. 1992); Utah, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 26-6-20.5 (Supp. 1991); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1705
(Supp. 1991); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-36.1 (Supp. 1991); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105 (West Supp. 1991); West Virginia, W. VA.
CODE § 16-3C-3 (1991); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 146.022(3), 146.025(5)
(West Supp. 1991); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 35-4-107 (1977).
10 Elizabeth M. Tobin, Comment, Confidentiality of Blood Donor Identity: Plaintiffv.
National Blood Supply, 23 SUFF. U.L. REV. 183, 185-87 (1989) (noting that the physician-patient privilege, constitutional right to privacy constraints and society's interest in an adequate blood supply system are considerations analyzed by the courts in
blood donor discovery situations).
11 125 N.J. 328, 593 A.2d 318 (1991) (per curiam).
12 Id. at 329, 593 A.2d at 319 (Pollock, J., concurring).
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:5C-1 to -14 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991). Section 26:5C9(a) addressed disclosure of information relating to AIDS and HIV infection by
court order and stated:
The record of a person who has or is suspected of having AIDS or
HIV infection may be disclosed by an order of a court of competent
jurisdiction which is granted pursuant to an application showing good
cause therefor. At a good cause hearing the court shall weigh the
public interest and need for disclosure against the injury to the person who is the subject of the record, to the physician-patient relationship, and to the services offered by the program. Upon the granting
of the order, the court, in determining the extent to which a disclosure of all or any part of a record is necessary, shall impose appropriate safeguards to prevent an unauthorized disclosure.
§ 26:5C-9(a).
Michigan,

MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.658 (West
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fringed a blood donor's constitutional right of privacy.' 4 The
Snyder court held that under careful court supervision, limited
discovery of the blood donor's identity was appropriate and did
not unduly prejudice the donor's privacy rights.' 5
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 23, 1984, William Snyder (Snyder) entered St.
Joseph's Hospital in Paterson to undergo elective coronary bypass and valve replacement heart surgery.'" Several hours after
the initial surgery, Snyder developed a bleeding artery that required a second surgical procedure.' 7 Because of blood loss,
Snyder required a substantial blood transfusion.18 St. Joseph's
Hospital received its blood supply from the Bergen Community
Blood Center (BCBC), a member of the American Association of
and St.
Blood Banks (AABB).' 9 Snyder recuperated successfully
2°
Joseph's Hospital discharged him a few weeks later.
In March 1985, a reliable test became available for the na2
tion's blood banks to analyze donated blood for the HIV virus. '
14 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 336, 593 A.2d at 322 (Pollock, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 329-30, 593 A.2d at 319 (Pollock, J., concurring). In a per curiam decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed without opinion the judgment of the
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. Id. The supreme court indicated
that its reasons were substantially the same as those articulated by Judge Pressler in
Snyder v. Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. 281, 582 A.2d 307 (App. Div. 1990). Snyder,
125 N.J. at 329, 593 A.2d at 319.
16 Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. at 284, 582 A.2d at 309.
17 Id. at 284-85, 582 A.2d at 309. In his complaint, Snyder contended that the
second operation was due to his physician's negligence in failing to properly suture
an artery in the first operation. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint at 2-3, Snyder
v. Mekhjian (No. L-37610-88) (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
18 Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. at 284-85, 582 A.2d at 309. In his complaint, Snyder asserted that he experienced substantial blood loss during a six hour period
between the initial heart surgery and the corrective procedure. Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint at 3, Snyder v. Mekhjian (No. L-37610-88) (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1989).
19 Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. at 285, 582 A.2d at 309. The Bergen Community
Blood Center (BCBC) is a non-profit entity that collects and distributes donated
blood to area hospitals. Id. The American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) is a
national non-profit organization which is comprised of non-profit blood banks. Id.
AABB collects approximately one-half of the nation's donated blood, while the
American Red Cross acquires the remaining half. Id. at 285-86, 582 A.2d at 309.
20 Id. at 285, 582 A.2d at 309.
21 Id. The enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) test for the HIV virus
was licensed by the Food & Drug Administration in March 1985. Warren R. Janowitz, Safety of the Blood Supply, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 611, 613 (1988). Because the
ELISA test was first used to screen blood, it was deliberately calibrated low to minimize false-negative results. Theodore M. Hammett, HIV Antibody Testing: Procedures,
Interpretation, and Reliability of Results, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., AIDS BULL. (U.S. Dep't
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After participating in a nationwide "Look Back" blood analysis
program, BCBC informed St. Joseph's Hospital that the donor
of unit number 29FO784 currently tested positive for the HIV
virus. 2 1 St. Joseph's Hospital subsequently examined its records

and discovered that Snyder had received unit number 29FO784
blood during his operation.24 Shortly thereafter, St. Joseph's
Hospital notified Snyder's physician. 5 The physician ascertained
that Snyder, now living in Florida, had tested positive for the
HIV virus. 26 The physician also noted that Snyder had none of
the risk factors associated with the virus. 7
In February 1989, Snyder sued St. Joseph's Hospital, BCBC,
and AABB in New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, alleging
strict liability and negligence.2 8 Snyder requested production
of BCBC's records pertaining to the donor of unit number
29FO784. 29 After BCBC redacted the donor's name and adof Justice, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1988, at 4. The twice-repeated positive ELISA
test results are confirmed by the Western Blot test. Id. The confirmatory Western
Blot test is performed because the ELISA test produces a high false-positive rate.
Id. Centers for Disease Control estimates that the ELISA test, twice performed, is
more than 99% effective in screening for the HIV virus. Id. at 5.
22 Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 N.J. 328, 332, 593 A.2d 318, 320 (1991) (Pollock, J.,
concurring). The "Look Back" program was conducted by the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB). Id. Under this program, blood banks were able to
ascertain if individuals currently testing positive for the HIV virus had donated
blood prior to March 1985. Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. at 285, 582 A.2d at 309. In
cases where this occurred, the blood bank would determine which hospital received
that donor's blood and would notify the hospital. Id.
23 Mekhjian, 244 NJ. Super. at 285, 582 A.2d at 309. In its letter to St. Joseph's
Hospital, BCBC noted that it had supplied the infected blood to the hospital on
August 23, 1984, the same day of Snyder's open heart surgery. Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. In its notification to Snyder's physician, St. Joseph's Hospital offered its
resources for testing, as well as counselling services. Id. Snyder was eventually
counselled by a physician in Florida. Id.
26 Id. The Centers for Disease Control encouraged all individuals who received
blood transfusions prior to ELISA screening (March 1985) to be tested for the HIV
virus. Id. Snyder tested positive and his wife and two sons tested negative. Id.
27 Id. High-risk factors include the following: homosexual or bisexual men, Haitian immigrants, intravenous drug-users, hemophiliacs, and sexual contact with
other high-risk individuals. Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 NJ. 328, 331, 593 A.2d 318,
319 (1991) (Pollock, J., concurring).
28 Mekhjian, 244 NJ. Super. at 285-87, 582 A.2d at 309-10. Snyder also claimed
consumer fraud and sought punitive damages against BCBC and AABB because of
their "knowing and irresponsible failure to protect the blood supply from AIDS
contamination." Id. at 287, 582 A.2d at 310.
29 Id. The New Jersey rule of discovery governing production of documents
stated in relevant part:
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request ...
to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy any designated documents ... ,
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dress, it forwarded the records to Snyder and objected to further
discovery. ° Snyder then filed a motion to compel discovery
seeking to depose and interrogate the blood donor. 3 '
The trial court denied Snyder's motion.32 On appeal, the
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed and remanded.33 The appellate court held that where a litigant's disor to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of [discovery] and which
are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the
request is served....
(b) Procedure. The request may, without leave of court, be
served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon
any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint
upon that party. The request shall set forth the items to be inspected
either by individual item or by category, and describe each item and
category with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a
reasonable time, place, and manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts.
N.J. CT. R. 4:18-1.
30 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 332, 593 A.2d at 320 (Pollock, J., concurring). Among the
documents provided to Snyder was a pre-screening questionnaire pertaining to a
person's suitability to donate which was completed by the anonymous blood donor.
Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 3, Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 N.J. 328, 593 A.2d
318 (1991) (per curiam) (No. 32,876). Additionally, Snyder received results of all
lab tests rendered on the donated blood. Id. Finally, Snyder obtained screening
and testing procedures performed by BCBC during the time the donor gave blood.
Id.
31 Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 3, Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 N.J. 328, 593
A.2d 318 (1991) (per curiam) (No. 32,876). Rule 4:18-1 provides that upon objection to discovery, "[t]he party submitting the request may move for an order under
R. 4:23 with respect to any objection to or other failure to respond to the request or
any part thereof, or any failure to permit inspection as requested." N.J. CT. R.
4:18-1(b).
32 Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. at 287, 582 A.2d at 310. The trial court also dismissed all claims except the negligence claims against BCBC, AABB and the surgeons, and the punitive damage assertions against BCBC and AABB. Id.
Additionally, the trial court held that BCBC was not immune as a non-profit corporation or association organized solely for charitable, educational, hospital or religious purposes. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987)). The trial
court further asserted that BCBC was not subject to the $10,000 damages limitation for non-profit corporations organized exclusively for hospital purposes. Id.
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-8 (West 1987)).
33 Id. at 297, 582 A.2d at 315. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of all
strict liability claims. Id. Specifically, the appellate court stated that the physicians
were exempt from a strict liability claim. Id. at 292, 582 A.2d at 313 (citing Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 597, 258 A.2d 697, 703 (1969) (the nature,
usefulness, and need of services performed by doctors precluded imposition of
strict liability in tort)). The appellate court also found that St. Joseph's Hospital
could not be held strictly liable. Id. at 292-93, 582 A.2d at 313 (citing Johnson v.
Mountainside Hosp., 239 N.J. Super. 312, 321, 571 A.2d 318, 322 (App. Div. 1990)
(a hospital in the business of providing health care is not subject to theories of strict
liability)). The appellate division further held that strict liability was inapplicable to
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covery needs were essential to the cause of action and could only
be provided by the donor, limited discovery under prudent court
supervision was proper and justifiable. 4 The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted
the defendant's motion for leave to ap36
peal3 5 and affirmed.

III.

THE COMPETING INTERESTS

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that the scope of
discovery in civil litigation covers any non-privileged matter relevant to the controversy in dispute. 7 A litigant's right to discover
the identity of an HIV infected blood donor thus hinges upon
balancing the interest served by the state action in compelling
discovery 38 against any other competing interests. 39 These other
BCBC. Id. at 291-92, 582 A.2d at 312-13 (citing Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J.
Super. 331, 340, 317 A.2d 392, 397 (App. Div. 1974) (the product a blood bank
supplies is not unreasonably dangerous, especially when there is no recognized
method of detecting the defect), aff'd, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975)). Finally,
the appellate court held that AABB could not be held strictly liable because it
neither supplied nor tested blood. Id. at 292, 582 A.2d at 313.
34 Id. at 296, 582 A.2d at 314-15.
35 Snyder v. Mekhjian, 126 N.J. 318, 598 A.2d 879 (1991).
36 Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 N.J. 328, 329, 593 A.2d 318, 319 (1991) (per
curiam). Justice Pollock wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 329, 593 A.2d
at 319 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Garibaldi wrote a dissenting opinion. d. at
347, 593 A.2d at 328 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
37 FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26(b), covering the scope of discovery, states in pertinent part:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery
is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
party seeking discovery or to the claim on defense of any other party
.... It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Id. Compare N.J. CT. R. 4:10-2 (containing the same text as FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
dealing with the scope of discovery). See Sylvia B. Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules
4:10-2 cmt. 1 (1991). See also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (a court order
that compels or curtails pretrial discovery is state action and is therefore subject to
constitutional limitations).
39 Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1990)
("[c]onsideration of a motion for a protective order always involves a balancing of
one party's interest in disclosure against the opposition's desire to maintain confidentiality"); Doe v. American Red Cross, 125 F.R.D. 646, 649 (D.S.C. 1989) (in
deciding whether to grant a protective order, a court must balance the competing
interests involved); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d
1003, 1010 (Colo. 1988) (balancing test employed to decide litigant's ability to dis-
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interests included the physician-patient privilege, society's interest in an adequate volunteer blood supply system, and the blood
donor's right to privacy.4 °
A.

The Physician-PatientPrivilege

At common law, the physician-patient privilege did not exist." Under most state statutes, however, the communication between a physician and patient is now privileged.4 2 The rationale
cover a blood donor's identity); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So.2d
533, 535 (Fla. 1987) ("the court must balance the competing interests that would
be served by granting discovery or by denying it"); Doe v. University of Cincinnati,
538 N.E.2d 419, 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (court must balance the interests served
by allowing discovery against any resulting harm); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v.
Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (invoking a balancing test to
determine whether donor discovery was proper).
40 Richard C. Bollow & Daryl J. Lapp, Protectingthe Confidentiality of Blood Donors'
Identities In AIDS Litigation, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 345 (1987) (discussing the physician-patient privilege, federal and state constitutional right to privacy constraints,
and abuse-of-discovery rules as issues raised in blood donor identity challenges);
Richard C. Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Information: An Analytical
Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L. REV. 871, 874-75 (1989)
(blood donor's right to privacy and safeguarding the professional-patient relationship are values favoring the confidentiality of donor health care information); Denise C. Andresen, Note, AIDS-Related Litigation: The Competing Interests Surrounding
Discovery of Blood Donors'Identities, 19 IND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1986) (emphasizing that
a blood donor's right to privacy and society's interest in maintaining a sufficient
blood supply system cannot preclude a plaintiff's right to obtain discovery); Tobin,
supra note 10, at 185-87. See also infra note 139.
41 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 at 818-19 (John T. McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961).
42 Id. at 820-28. The following states have adopted a physician-patient privilege:
Alaska, ALASKA R. EvID. 504; Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1982);
Arkansas, ARK. R. EvID. 503; California, CAL. EvID. CODE § 992 (West 1966); Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107 (West 1989); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
4
STAT. ANN. § 52-1 6o (West 1960); Delaware, DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 503; District of
Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1989); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.241(2)
(West 1991); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (Michie 1982); Hawaii, HAw. R.
EvID. 504; Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 9-203(4) (1990); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 8-802 (Smith-Hurd 1984); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (West 1983);
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1950); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427
(1983); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734(B) (West 1991); Maine, ME. R.
EviD. 503; Maryland, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19 - 34 4(g) (1990); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12g (West 1983); Michigan, MICH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2157 (West 1986); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(l)(d)
(West 1988); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (1972); Missouri, Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 491.060(5) (Vernon 1952); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (1991);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1989); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 49.215-.245 (Michie 1986); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:26
(1984); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1976); New York, N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4504(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991); North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-53 (1986); North Dakota, N.D. R. EVID. 503; Ohio, OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
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for the privilege is typically stated as the encouragement of open
communication between the physician and patient to disclose all
information which may be helpful for the person's diagnosis and
treatment. 43 Because the privilege can impede discovery, statutes and judicial interpretation generally limit its scope to situations where the patient is seeking diagnosis and treatment. 44
In Krygier v. Airweld, Inc. ,4 a New York Supreme Court addressed application of its physician-patient privilege statute 46 to
the discovery of an alleged HIV-positive blood donor's identity.4 7
In Krygier, the deceased plaintiff's estate brought a wrongful
death action against a blood bank, claiming that the decedent's
transfusion resulted in his contracting the HIV virus. 48 In reaching its decision, the Krygier court asserted that society had a
strong interest in the continuous exchange of information between the physician and patient because it helped ensure effective diagnosis and treatment.4 " The Krygier court also recognized
§ 2317.02(B)(1) (Anderson 1991); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2503
(West 1980); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.235 (1989); Pennsylvania, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929 (1982); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws. § 5-37.3-4 (Supp.
1991); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-6 to -7 (1987); Texas,
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b § 5.08 (West Supp. 1991); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-24-8(4) (1987); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (Michie 1984):
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 5.60.060(4) (West 1963); Wisconsin, Wis.
§ 905.04 (West 1975); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (1977).
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, federal courts will apply the relevant
state law governing evidentiary privileges. FED. R. EvID. 501.
43 EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98, at 244 (3d ed. 1984).
44 See, Developments In The Law-Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450,
1532-39 (1985) (discussing the history and scope of the physician-patient privilege); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("Whatever their origins,
these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for the truth.").
45 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
46 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4504(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991). The relevant portion of the New York statute states:
(a) Confidential information privileged. Unless the patient waives the
privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed practical nursing, dentistry or chiropractic
shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in
attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary
to enable him to act in that capacity.
Id.
47 Kygier, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
48 Id. at 476. The decedent entered the hospital after being severely burned in
an explosion. Id. In the course of treatment, the decedent received twenty-one
units of blood. Id. Plaintiff alleged that death resulted from complications associated with AIDS. Id.
49 Id. (citing Greene v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 437 N.Y.S.2d 844,
847 (Sup. Ct. 1981)).
STAT. ANN.
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the potential inequity of exposing a donor, who altruistically
donated blood, to the embarrassment and insinuation associated
with the HIV virus and AIDS.50 Hence, the Krygier court held
that New York's physician-patient privilege statute precluded discovery of information exchanged between blood banks and
donors. 5 '
Construing a similar physician-patient privilege statute,52 the
Supreme Court of Louisiana in Laburre v. EastJefferson General Hospital 5s analyzed facts analogous to those in Krygier but reached a
contrary conclusion with respect to the statute.54 In Laburre, the
plaintiff allegedly contracted hepatitis through blood transfusions during the course of surgery. 55 During discovery among
the various defendants, the blood bank refused to provide names
and addresses of the blood donors. 56 The Louisiana Supreme
50 Id. at 476-77. For a discussion of the social stigma attached to the HIV virus
and AIDS, see infra note 148.
51 Id. at 476-77. The court pointed out that if the physician-patient privilege
statute was inapplicable, the donor's right to privacy and society's interest in maintaining an all-volunteer blood supply system would still preclude discovery. Id. at
477. It should be noted that New York was the first state to adopt a physicianpatient privilege statute in 1828. See WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 2380, at 819.
52 The relevant portion of the Louisiana physician-patient privilege statute
states:
Except as hereinafter provided, in civil cases ....
a patient or his
authorized representative, has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent a health care provider from disclosing any communication,
wherever made, relating to any fact, statement or opinion which was
necessary to enable that health care provider or any other health care
provider to diagnose, treat, prescribe or act for the patient.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734(B) (West 1991).
53 555 So.2d 1381 (La. 1990).
54 Id. at 1383-84.
55 Id. at 1382. Specifically, the plaintiff entered East Jefferson General Hospital
and received several blood units after surgery. Id. Two blood units had been
bought from the Blood Center of Southeast Louisiana [Blood Center] and another
from Mercy Hospital. Id. Two months later, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having
chronic non-A, non-B hepatitis. Id. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff sued East Jefferson Hospital, Mercy Hospital and the Blood Center asserting strict liability. Id.
Although the plaintiff did not contract the HIV virus, the court discussed the issues
confronted when a person acquires HIV through blood transfusion administration.
See id. at 1384-85.
56 Id. at 1382. Mercy Hospital attempted to depose the Blood Center's records
custodian. Id. Also, Mercy sent a subpoena duces tecum to the Blood Center. Id.
After deleting blood donor names and addresses, the Blood Center forwarded donor cards and follow-up questionnaires prepared by the two donors who supplied
the blood. Id. The Blood Center supported its opposition to discovery by asserting
that the information was privileged or otherwise confidential. Id. Mercy then filed a
motion to compel disclosure of blood donor names and addresses. Id. The trial
court denied the motion. Id. After granting Mercy's application for writ to review,
the court of appeals entered judgment mandating the Blood Center to reveal the
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Court posited that a blood donor was not a patient seeking treatment or therapy from blood bank personnel."' Additionally, the
supreme court emphasized that the free flow of information did
not benefit the blood donor in these cases as it benefitted a patient in a physician/patient relationship; rather, it helped the recipient of the donated blood.5 8 Consequently, the Laburre court
determined that a blood donor was not shielded from discovery
by the Louisiana physician-patient privilege statute.5 9
B.

Societal Interest in the Blood Supply System

The primary objective of blood-gathering organizations is to
ensure a safe and adequate supply of blood to society. 6° It is said
that donor confidentiality effectively promotes this goal. 6 ' Because-blood donor disclosure may disserve these interests, courts
carefully scrutinize this issue in HIV infection litigation and pretrial discovery conflicts.6 2
requested information. Id. at 1382-84. In its holding, the appellate court stated
that the information was not privileged under Louisiana's physician-patient privilege statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734 (West 1991). Laburre, 555 So.2d at
1383. Further, the court of appeals opined that there was no undue harm to the
public welfare by granting disclosure. Id. Finally, the appellate court stated that the
issuance of protective orders would protect the donors' privacy rights. Id.
57 Id. at 1384. The court defined a patient as "a person who is in need of medical care." Id.
58 Id. The court pointed out that the legislature was better equipped to determine whether a special privilege pertaining to the exchange of information during
the blood donation process was necessary. Id. n.4.
59 Id. at 1384. The court went on to preclude discovery, however, based on a
right-to-privacy analysis. Id. at 1384-85.
60 See National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,702, 32,702 (U.S. Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare 1974) (statement noting the policy's ultimate goals of improving
the quality and the quantity of donated blood).
61 Karen S. Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7J. LEGAL MED. 131, 161 (1986). The author noted the
important role confidentiality serves in ensuring an adequate blood supply:
"[c]onfidentiality... ensures that donors will not be deterred from donating by the
possibility that information that could have a significant impact upon their employment, insurability, reputation in the community, and personal relationships will be
publicly disclosed. Confidentiality thus ensures the adequacy of the nation's blood
supply." Id. The author also made the following observations pertaining to quality:
[E]nsuring confidentiality maintains the integrity of the health history
screening process and, therefore, the safety of the blood supply, by
creating an environment in which prospective donors will feel free to
be completely honest and accurate about their health histories without concern that information in the health history might be disclosed
to persons not connected to the donation process.
Id.
62 See Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 362 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
("disclosure of donors' identities could severely impair the volunteer blood sup-
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A Pennsylvania court in Taylor v. West Penn Hospital63 was the
first to premise its holding on the effect donor discovery would
have on the blood supply system.6 4 In Taylor, the plaintiff contracted the HIV virus through blood transfusions performed in
the course of open heart surgery.6 5 During discovery procedures, the blood bank sought a protective order to preserve the
donor's anonymity.6 6 In precluding discovery, the Taylor court
ply"); Boutte v. Blood Systems, Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989) (discounting a defendant's argument that donor discovery would rapidly destroy a
blood bank's ability to collect adequate quantities of blood to meet state and national needs.); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Serv., 125 F.R.D. 646, 653
(D.S.C. 1989) ("assurances of confidentiality play a central role in maintaining a
healthy and adequate blood supply"); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District
Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1012 (Colo. 1988) (weighing society's interest both in maintaining an abundant supply of donated blood and in preserving a safe blood supply,
then granting donor discovery); South Florida Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467
So.2d 798, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (confidentiality of blood donor records
was essential to ensure an adequate blood supply capable of meeting society's demands), aff'd, 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Laburre v. EastJefferson Gen. Hosp., 555
So.2d 1381, 1384 (La. 1990) ("fear by volunteers of being called into litigation and
subjected to questioning about intimate details of their personal lives could drastically affect the supply of blood donations"); Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d
475, 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (society's interest in maintaining adequate volunteer
blood supplies combined with the blood bank's interest in donor anonymity outweighed the need for discovery); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419,
425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (society's interest in the blood supply, a vital public interest, favored denying discovery); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531,
537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) ("the need to protect our blood supply is a real and
important concern"), appeal granted, 577 A.2d 891 (1990); Taylor v. West Penn
Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 190-91 (C.P. 1987) (society's interest in a safe and
adequate blood supply prevented donor discovery); Gulf Coast Regional Blood
Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that society's
interest in the blood supply was not paramount to the plaintiff's right to blood
donor discovery); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 679
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (injury to society's interest by granting a discovery order did
not outweigh the plaintiff's need for information).
63 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (C.P. 1987).
64 Id. at 186.
65 d. at 178. Two months after the plaintiff's operation, the donor of the blood
used during the operation donated blood once more. Id. This donation, however,
tested HIV-positive. Id. The plaintiff was notified immediately and was found to
test positive for the HIV virus. Id.
66 Id. at 179. The blood bank voluntarily gave the plaintiff all of the information
requested except the donor's name. Id. The plaintiff scheduled a deposition of
blood bank employees designed to discover the identity of the blood donor. Id.
The court noted that discovering the donor's identity would permit the plaintiff to
determine whether the donor was in a high risk category when the donation was
made. Id. at 180. The court posited that if the donor wag a high risk and was informed not to donate by the blood bank but did so anyway, the plaintiff would
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stressed that disclosure would deter one's volition to donate.67
First, the Taylor court noted that the public would hesitate to donate blood if test data could be revealed to third parties and donors could be involved in litigation.6" Second, the Taylor court
stressed that the possibility of disseminating information that
could result in stigmatization will deter potential blood donors. 69
Thus, the Taylor court precluded donor discovery because of the
potential chilling effect that disclosure would have on the nation's blood supply system.7 °
In Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, 7 t a federal district
court considered the potential effect that granting donor discovprobably sue the donor. Id. Further, the court perceived that this donor could be
an important witness during the trial. Id. at 180-81.
To analyze the issue, the court recognized Pennsylvania's rule defining the
scope of discovery. Id. at 181. The rule states in pertinent part:
[A] party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, content, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.1 (emphasis added).
The court, however, noted that this rule was subject to limitations set forth in
PA. R. Civ. P. 4011. Taylor, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at 181. Rule 4011 precludes discovery
which relates to privileged matter, would be embarrassing, annoying, oppressive or
cause undue expense, or is sought in bad faith. PA. R. Civ. P. 4011.
67 Taylor, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at 187-88. The court began by highlighting the policy of the federal government in maintaining the confidentiality of the records of
blood donors. Id. at 187 (citing AIDS Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 111202 (1985)). See also supra note 60.
68 Taylor, 48 Pa. D. & C. 3d at 189.
69 Id. The court asserted that "[p]ersons who test positively for AIDS are likely
to be socially ostracized and to lose their jobs if this information becomes known."
Id.
70 Id. at 186. Specifically, the court justified its holding by first stating that
screening mechanisms would become less effective if donors were deterred from
giving complete and honest answers. Id. at 190. The court next articulated that
possible disclosure of information to persons not connected to the blood donation
process would deter people from donation. Id. The court also enunciated that the
best strategy to combat the spread of AIDS was to encourage people most likely
infected to be tested and educated about the disease. Id. The court charged that
confidentiality was the cornerstone to this strategy. Id. Finally, the court stressed
that prohibiting discovery did not significantly interfere with the plaintiff's cause of
action. Id. at 191. The court stated that information already provided was enough
for a jury's determination of reasonableness and compliance with blood donation
screening procedures. Id.
71 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989).
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ery would have on the blood supply system. 72 In Doe, the plaintiff contracted the HIV virus through a blood transfusion during
spleen and gall bladder surgery. 7' The plaintiff attempted to obtain the identity of the donor through written interrogatories but
the Red Cross objected.74 The Doe court perceived that permitting discovery of blood donors would undermine the maintenance of both the quantity and quality of the blood supply."5
The Doe court initially observed that confidentiality was essential
to support an all-volunteer system able to meet society's demands.76 Next, the Doe court articulated that confidentiality
strengthened the quality of blood supplied by enhancing the in72

Id. at 652-53.

73 Id. at 647. The thrust of plaintiff's negligence suit focused on the procedures

utilized by the American Red Cross during the blood donation in which the contaminated blood was acquired. Id. at 647-48. Upon reporting to a mobile Red
Cross site, the donor was given a pamphlet concerning suitability to donate blood.
Id. at 647. This pamphlet specifically detailed illnesses which could spread through
blood transfusions (hepatitis and HIV). Id. The blood donor also completed a
health history questionnaire. Id. at 648. The donor's questionnaire answers did not
immediately disqualify him. Id. Next, the questionnaire was reviewed by a nurse
with the donor. Id. During the review, the donor indicated that he had previously
tested positive for the "Australian antibody." Id. Because of uncertainty surrounding this term, the donor was precluded from donating indefinitely pending more
research. Id. After follow-up questions with the blood donor, research by the head
nurse and head of technical services, the donor was permitted to donate several
weeks later. Id. The donor subsequently made three donations. Id. The second
donation infected the plaintiff and the third tested HIV-positive under the newly
developed ELISA test. Id.
74 Id. at 649 n.4. After objection, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel answers
to the interrogatories or, alternatively, for a "veiled" deposition. Id. The Red
Cross argued that discovery violated the blood donor's privacy rights under the
state and federal constitutions. Id. at 649. The Red Cross further asserted that the
information was privileged and therefore not discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Finally, the Red Cross contended that the
discovery request was "unduly annoying, embarrassing, oppressive, and burdensome." Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).
75 Id. at 652-53. As to quantity, the court cited expert testimony and other cases
emphasizing that assurance of confidentiality is necessary to support a volunteer
donation system capable of meeting society's demands. Id. at 652. As to quality,
the court found that disclosure of the donor's personal history would result in an
unwillingness to supply accurate information during blood screening examination.
Id. at 653.
76 Id. at 652-53 (citing Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533
(Fla. 1987); Taylor v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (C.P. 1987)). The
court also asserted that the federal government endorsed the all-volunteer blood
supply system. Id. at 650 (citing National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,702, 32,702
(U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare 1974)). In announcing its National Blood
Policy, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare stated that "it is the policy of the United States Government... [t]o encourage, foster, and support efforts
designed to bring into being an all-voluntary blood donation system." National
Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. at 32,702.
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tegrity of information being submitted by the donor. 7 7 Accordingly, the Doe court denied discovery by finding that disclosure
would destroy confidentiality and adversely affect the blood sup78
ply system.
C. Blood Donor's Right To Privacy
The Constitution does not expressly provide for a person's
right to privacy. 79 The United States Supreme Court, however,
80
has construed at least two privacy interests in the Constitution.
First, an individual has a right to make certain important decisions. 8 ' Second, a person has a right to be free from governmental disclosure of personal matters. 82 In HIV infection-related
litigation surrounding blood donor discovery, the constitutional
challenge has focused upon the donor's disclosural privacy
77 Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 653. The court asserted that the integrity of information
concerning the donor's health history would be low if there were fear that personal
aspects of one's life could be disclosed. Id. Also, the court noted that disclosure of
a donor's health history may be made to individuals not associated with the blood
donation process. Id. Finally, the court perceived that confidentiality encouraged
those most likely to be infected with AIDS to get voluntarily tested. Id.
78

Id. at 657.

79 JOHN E. NOWACK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 417-18 (1978); see also Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (explaining
that, although the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right to privacy, it
was nevertheless proper for the Court to recognize this right).
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly grant a person a
right to privacy, it should be noted that states are free to provide for such a right in
their own constitutions. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CONST. art. II,
§ 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art.
I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
80 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
81 Id. at 599-600. This aspect of an individual's right to privacy has been limited
to areas of fundamental importance. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (child rearing and education).
82 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599. In Whalen, a New York State statute authorized the
operation of a central computer file containing names and addresses of individuals
obtaining prescriptions for certain drugs in which both a lawful and an unlawful
market existed. Id. at 591. The Court held that New York's statutory scheme did
not violate any Fourteenth Amendment right or liberty interest. Id. at 606. Discussing the disclosural right to privacy, the Court highlighted that medical information
is typically disclosed to hospital personnel, doctors, insurance companies, and
other public agencies as a matter of routine administration. Id. at 602. The Court
found that disclosure of information to state employees responsible for administration of the computer file did not amount to an improper invasion of one's privacy
rights because such a situation was not distinguishable from disclosure occurring in
other facets of the health care industry. Id.
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right.83
In Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service,84 the Florida
Supreme Court considered whether a blood donor's privacy
rights precluded discovery.85 The plaintiff, Donald Rasmussen,
received fifty-one units of blood through transfusions after being
struck by an automobile while sitting on a park bench.86 One
year later, Rasmussen was diagnosed with AIDS. 87 The South
Florida Blood Service objected to a subpoena duces tecum which
requested all documents concerning the blood donors. 88 The
Florida Supreme Court precluded discovery, basing its holding
on the donor's privacy interests.8 9 The court initially noted that
an amendment to the state constitution expressly provided for an
individual's right of privacy. 90 Construing the Florida and
United States Constitutions, the court observed that when cer83 See Boutte v. Blood Systems, Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D. La. 1989)
("[t]he donor clearly has a privacy interest in remaining anonymous"); Rasmussen
v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987) (federal and state privacy
rights extend protection, under certain circumstances, against exposure of personal
matters); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 423-24 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988) (a person's concern in avoiding exposure of personal matters arises in the
disclosure of information context); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d
531, 534 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (one's interest in eluding disclosure of personal
matters and privacy rights were implicated in exposure of medical records); Taylor
v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 185 (C.P. 1987) ("we find to be substantial the blood bank's claim that the identity of its blood donor is constitutionally
protected"); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 678-79 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) (one's ight to privacy extends to medical records and disclosure of
personal information).
84 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987).

85
86

Id. at 534.

Id. Rasmussen sued the driver and owner of the automobile for personal injuries. Id.
87 Id. at 534. Rasmussen died of AIDS one year after the diagnosis. Id. After his
death, his estate proceeded with this lawsuit. Id. n.l.
88 Id. at 534. The subpoena duces tecum requested from the South Florida
Blood Service "any and all records, documents and other material indicating the
names and addresses of the [51] blood donors identified on the attached records of
St. Francis Hospital regarding the plaintiff herein, Donald Rasmussen." South Fla.
Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 500
So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987). The Blood Service filed a motion to quash the subpoena or
grant a protective order. Rasmussen, 500 So.2d at 534. The motion was denied by
the trial court, and an order requiring the Blood Service to disclose the requested
information was made. Id. On certiorari review, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court order. Id. In reaching its decision, the appellate court employed a balancing test. Id.
89 Rasmussen, 500 So.2d at 538.
90 Id. at 536. The right to privacy clause of the Florida Constitution states:
Right of Privacy-Every natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from government intrusion into his private life except as
otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to
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tain personal matters are at issue, privacy rights afford protection. 9 The Florida Supreme Court stressed that the potential
exposure of permitting discovery extended beyond a third party
seeking information and could reach the donor's family, friends
and coworkers. 92 Thus, the Rasmussen court held that allowing
discovery impermissibly infringed upon the blood donor's privacy rights.9"
Approximately one year later, in Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood
Center v. District Court,94 the Colorado Supreme Court confronted
the same issue. 9 5 In Belle Bonfils, the plaintiff, K.W., received
blood contaminated with the HIV virus during an emergency
hysterectomy.9 6 Within a year, K.W. tested HIV-positive and
sought disclosure of blood donor identities after filing suit
limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as
provided by law.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
91 Rasmussen, 500 So.2d at 535-36 (citations omitted). Specifically, the court referred to independence in making important decisions and avoiding disclosure of
personal information. Id. at 535 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600
(1977)).
92 Id. at 537. The court found: "[i]f the requested information is released, and
[the plaintiff] queries the donors' friends and fellow employees, it will be functionally impossible to prevent occasional references to AIDS." Id. The court explained
that the impact of this exposure was magnified because of the stigma associated
with AIDS. Id. The court enunciated that such exposure may be "extremely disruptive and even devastating to the individual donor." Id. For further discussion on
the stigma associated with HIV and AIDS, see infra note 148.
93 Rasmussen, 500 So.2d at 537. The court acknowledged the plaintiff's need but
concluded that the probative value of the information sought was low, and did not
advance Rasmussen's cause of action. Id. at 538.
94 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988).
95 Id. at 1004.
96 Id. Specifically, K.W. gave birth in February, 1985. Id. One month later K.W.
entered the same hospital for a postpartum hemorrhage. Id. During the second
hospital admission, an emergency hysterectomy was performed with the aid of six
units of blood supplied by the Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center. Id. One of the
six units of blood was contaminated with the HIV virus. Id.
K.W. brought suit, contending that Belle Bonfils failed to adhere to established
screening procedures before accepting the infected donor's blood. Id. at 1007.
Belle Bonfils screening procedures primarily consisted of requiring the donor to fill
out a health history questionnaire consisting of thirty yes/no inquiries. Id. An unsatisfactory answer to any one question would support a temporary or permanent
bar from donating blood. Id. Belle Bonfil technicians would discuss unsatisfactory
responses with the potential donor before reaching a conclusion. Id. The infected
donor's questionnaire in the instant case indicated four unsatisfactory responses.
Id. Specifically, the answers and follow-up questioning showed that the donor had
recently taken the drug lopresser, suffered from high blood pressure, visited Germany, Denmark and Copenhagen in the past three years, and finally, had suffered
from gonorrhea. Id.
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against the blood bank. 97 Unlike the Rasmussen court, the Colorado Supreme Court held that K.W. was entitled to discovery
from the donors. 98 The supreme court acknowledged the donor's privacy interest, especially in light of the potential humiliation and embarrassment associated with identification as an HIV
carrier.99 Nevertheless, the Colorado Supreme Court justified its
holding because donor discovery was essential for K.W. to effectively litigate the claim.' 0 0
In Doe v. Borough of Barrington,'0 ' a NewJersey federal district
court analyzed the privacy rights of an individual suffering from
HIV infection. 10 2 In Barrington,while police officers searched the
plaintiff's husband incident to an arrest, he exclaimed that he was
HIV-positive and that the police should be careful of skin lesions.'0 3 Subsequent conversations involving police officers re97 Id. at 1005. K.W. sought discovery of the identities of six blood donors and
production of each donor's records. Id. Belle Bonfils objected, but supplied donor
cards with the name, address, and other personal information redacted. Id. K.W.
subsequently sought a court order to compel discovery, seeking blood donor identification and completed record cards. Id. The trial court granted K.W.'s motion to
compel discovery. Id. Specifically, the trial court ordered Belle Bonfils to produce a
completed donor card pertaining to the infected donor. Id. Also, the trial court
order permitted K.W. to contact the donor to determine the donor's medical history. Id. Finally, the trial court order instructed K.W.'s attorney to maintain the
confidentiality of information obtained. Id. Belle Bonfils then filed a petition to the
Colorado Supreme Court for a rule to show cause why the information was not
confidential and privileged. Id. at 1004.
98 Id. at 1013. The supreme court allowed K.W. to submit written questions to
the district court clerk. Id. at 1014. The district court clerk would be given the
name and address of the infected donor. Id. The court clerk would then mail the
questions to the infected donor. Id. After the blood donor completed the questions, he would mail them back to the court clerk. Id. The supreme court mandated
that the court clerk keep the infected donor's name and address in strictest confidence. Id.
99 Id. at 1012 n.12 (quoting Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So.2d
533, 537 (Fla. 1987)). For further discussion concerning the stigma associated with
HIV and AIDS, see infra note 148.
The supreme court also noted that a blood donor's name, address and telephone number are not protected by the physician-patient privilege. Id. at 1009 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(l)(d) (1987)). In the court's view, such
information was not "acquired in attending the patient" nor was it "necessary to
enable him [the physician] to prescribe or act for the patient." Id. (quoting COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(l)(d) (1987)).
1O0 Id. at 1013. The court recognized that the information was necessary for
K.W. to determine whether screening procedures were followed from the donor's
perspective. Id. The court stressed that K.W.'s negligence claim focused upon the
contention that established screening procedures were not adhered to before accepting blood from the infected donor. Id. at 1007.
101 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).
102 Id. at 382-91.
103 Id. at 378. While driving through the Borough of Barrington, James Tarvis,
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suited in disclosure of the husband's identity throughout the
community via word of mouth, newspaper, radio and television." ° 4 The plaintiff sued, claiming civil rights violations under
the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section
1983.105 The district court initially acknowledged the plaintiff's
constitutional right of privacy in medical information. 10 6 The
district court determined that no compelling state interest existed to justify the government's disclosure of the plaintiff's medical condition. 0 7 Accordingly, the court found that disclosure of
plaintiff's illness violated his right to privacy.' 0 8
Jane Doe, and her husband were stopped by a police officer and questioned. Id.
The police officer arrested Jane Doe's husband and impounded the automobile; at
this time, the husband stated that he tested HIV-positive. Id. The police later released James Tarvis and Jane Doe, but detained-Doe's husband for unlawful possession of a hypodermic needle and pursuant to an Essex County burglary detainer. Id.
Later that day, James Tarvis drove to Jane Doe's home and left his car engine running in the driveway. Id. Apparently, the car slipped into gear, rolled down the
driveway, and crashed into a neighbor's fence. Id. Police arrived on the scene
shortly thereafter, responding to a radio call. Id.
104 Id. at 378-79. The police told the neighbor whose fence was damaged that
Doe's husband had AIDS. Id. at 378. The police also exclaimed that the neighbors
should wash themselves with disinfectant for protection. Id. The neighbors became
upset and contacted parents in the community because Jane Doe's four children
attended the same school as their own children. Id. at 379. The community panicked; eleven parents removed their children from the school. Id. Further, the media covered the story reporting it in the local newspapers and on television. Id.
105 Id. This section provided:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
106 Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 382 (citing In Re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810
F.2d 67 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987); Trade Waste Management
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Westinghouse,
638 F.2d 570 (3d. Cir. 1980)). In asserting this, the district court opined that a
person has a right to be free from disclosure of personal matters. Id. (citing Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). Accordingly, the district court found that disclosure
of one's medical condition, in particular with respect to AIDS, was a personal matter. Id.
107 Id. at 385. The defendant asserted that the advice to neighbors to wash themselves was to prevent the spread of AIDS. Id. The district court acknowledged that
while preventing the spread of AIDS was a proper state objective, it was not effectively satisfied by the officer's comments. Id. The district court reasoned that there
was no real risk of HIV and AIDS through casual contact. Id. Further, scientific
knowledge supporting this conclusion was available at the time of the incident. Id.
108 Id. In so holding, the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. Id. at 378. The district court rejected various defenses raised by the police
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The AIDS Assistance Act

In response to the AIDS epidemic, the New Jersey legislature promulgated the AIDS Assistance Act (Act) in 1984.'09 Like
most other state legislatures, New Jersey provided guidelines for
educational programs on AIDS, disclosure of AIDS case records
by written consent and penalties for improper disclosure of patient medical records. 10 Moreover, the Act expressly provided
for the confidentiality of AIDS case records."' Generally, unless
written consent is obtained, or the Act explicitly permits disclosure,1 2 any disclosure is improper and actionable at law." 3 Secofficer and the town. Id. at 386-87. Specifically, the police officer claimed that the
plaintiff lacked standing, that a finding of misconduct was a prerequisite to liability
under § 1983, that the information was "published" when Jane Doe's husband exclaimed he had AIDS, and, finally that because no conclusive facts about AIDS existed, his warning was justified. Id. The town further asserted that because other
municipalities did not have policies that trained police about AIDS, no obligation to
institute one existed. Id. at 390. The town noted that no federal or state law mandated formulation of such a policy. Id. at 390-91.
109 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:5C-1 to 14. (West 1987 & Supp. 1991). The legislature
listed its findings in a preliminary section of the Act:
a. The effective identification, diagnosis, care and treatment of
persons who have contracted acquired immune deficiency syndrome,
commonly known as "AIDS," is of paramount public importance;
f. People who have already been infected might not be aware of
their exposure and may unknowingly infect hundreds more individuals;
g. Resultantly, the outbreak of AIDS has reached alarming proportions because of its highly contagious nature with NewJersey ranking fourth in the nation of the number of reported cases.
§ 26:5C-2.
110 §§ 26:5C-1 to -14. See Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 5 (examining state legislation governing AIDS and HIV infection-related issues in medical privacy and
discrimination law).
111 § 26:5C-7. The section states in part, "[a] record.., which contains identifying information about a person who has or is suspected of having AIDS or HIV
infection is confidential and shall be disclosed only for the purposes authorized by this
act." Id. (emphasis added).
112 § 26:5C-8. The Act states that disclosure without prior written consent of the
individual who is the subject of the record is proper:
(1) To qualified personnel for the purpose of conducting scientific research ....
(2) To qualified personnel for the purpose of conducting management audits, financial audits or program evaluation ....
(3) To qualified personnel involved in medical education or in
the diagnosis and treatment of the person who is the subject of the
record....
(4) To the department as required by State or federal law.
(5) As permitted by rules and regulations adopted by the commissioner for the purposes of disease prevention and control.
(6) In all other instances authorized by State or federal law.
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tion 26:5C-9(a) of the Act, however, provides for disclosure by
court order when good cause is shown.' 14 Most importantly in
disclosure cases, this provision codifies a balancing test under
which a court must weigh the public's interest and the moving
party's need for disclosure against the physician-patient privilege
and the donor's privacy interest." 15 Consequently, as AIDS related litigation increased in New Jersey, section 26:5C-9(a) provided courts with the proper analytical framework 6to resolve
issues that arose during pretrial discovery conflicts."
IV.

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION

26:5C-9(a)

IN

SNYDER

It was against this backdrop of litigation, legislative pronouncement and the AIDS epidemic, that the New Jersey
Supreme Court decided Snyder v. Mekhjian. 1"7 In Snyder, the court
was summoned to decide whether section 26:5C-9(a) permitted
disclosure of a donor's identity and whether the statute infringed
upon a blood donor's constitutional right of privacy." 8 Several
of the justices stressed the sensitivity of the issue, noting that the
public interest in confidentiality and a blood donor's privacy
rights were significant considerations." 9 Nevertheless, the majority held that limited access under prudent court supervision
was appropriate and justified. 2 °
§ 26:5C-8(b).
113 § 26:5C- 14.
114 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
115 Id.

116 Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 N.J. 328, 334, 593 A.2d 318, 321 (1991) (Pollock,J.,
concurring). Justice Pollock succinctly stated, "Unlike other courts, we have the
benefit of legislative guidance." Id.
117 Id. at 329, 593 A.2d at 319.
118 Id. at 336, 593 A.2d at 322 (Pollock, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 346-47, 593 A.2d at 327-28 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock
recognized the dissent's concern that granting discovery may result in an action
against the blood donor. Id. at 346, 593 A.2d 327 (Pollock, J., concurring). The
justice, however, emphasized that attorneys for the plaintiff had denied such intentions during oral argument. Id. The concurring justice declared that Snyder entered the hospital for corrective heart surgery and was now HIV positive. Id., 593
A.2d at 328 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock described Snyder's situation
as a living medical tragedy. Id.
Justice Garibaldi discussed the substantial suffering both Snyder and the blood
donor had endured because of HIV infection. Id. at 358, 593 A.2d at 333 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The justice further acknowledged the "innocent" mode in
which Snyder was infected. Id. Finally, Justice Garibaldi stressed that because of
this fact-sensitivity, no rigid bright-line test was appropriate in determining when
donor discovery is appropriate. Id., 593 A.2d at 334. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
120 Snyder v. Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. 281, 296, 582 A.2d 307, 314-15 (App.
Div. 1990) (citing Boutte v. Blood Systems, Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. La. 1989);
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The New Jersey Supreme Court indicated in a per curiam
announcement that it substantially adopted the reasoning of the
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. 12 ' In that opinion, Judge Pressler of the appellate division first examined Snyder's need for further information. 122 The judge observed that
the defendants had increased Snyder's information requirements
by repeatedly denying that unit number 29FO784 was contaminated with the HIV virus. 123 Judge Pressler also highlighted that
proof of BCBC's negligence hinged upon discovering whether
routine examination procedures were followed. 2 4 Finally, the
appellate court judge noted not only that Snyder's discovery
needs were pertinent to the issue but that the donor himself or
125
herself was the sole source of the information.
Judge Pressler next turned to the AIDS Assistance Act 126 for

guidance. 2 7 The judge initially recognized those provisions of
the Act intended to protect donors' confidentiality while making
limited information available for important scientific and health
reasons. 1 8 The appellate court judge noted that if information
could not be obtained through the specific provisions of section
26:5C-8,129 then the information sought could be obtained only
under the good cause exception of section 26:5C-9(a)."'3 The
judge added that upon finding good cause, a court must deterMason v. Regional Medical Ctr., 121 F.R.D. 300 (W.D. Ky. 1988); Belle Bonfils
Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appealgranted, 577 A.2d
891 (1990); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987)). See also Snyder, 125 N.J. at 347, 593 A.2d at 328 (Pollock, J., concurring).
121 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 329, 593 A.2d at 319.
122 Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. at 294, 582 A.2d at 314.
123 Id. The court noted that although the defendants did not deny that the donor
of unit number 29FO784 was currently infected with the AIDS virus, defendants
were forcing Snyder to prove that this donor was HIV-positive in 1984. Id. Judge
Pressler reasoned that defendants' refusal to admit this point should entitle plaintiffs to pursue direct proof. Id.
124 Id. at 294-95, 582 A.2d at 314. The court noted that by 1983, medical science
was aware that swelling of lymph nodes and various skin disorders were early symptoms of the HIV viral infection. Id. Moreover, the court highlighted that in 1983
blood banks routinely examined donors in search of these symptoms. Id. at 295,
582 A.2d at 314.
125 Id.
126 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:5C-1 to -14 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991). See supra notes
109-16 and accompanying text.
127 Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. at 295-96, 582 A.2d at 314.
128 Id. at 295, 582 A.2d at 314. The judge referred, in general terms, to
§§ 26:5C-5 to -14. Id. at 295, 582 A.2d at 314.
129 Id. (citing § 26:5C-8). See supra note 112.
130 Id. (citing § 26:5C-9(a)). See supra note 13.
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mine the scope of disclosure and impose appropriate safeguards
to protect the donor. 3 '
Judge Pressler held that Snyder's application for limited donor discovery satisfied the good cause requirement.13 2
The
judge outlined specific limitations the trial court might apply in
the instant case.133 For example, the appellate court noted that if
the donor had died, the trial judge should obtain information
concerning the stage of the donor's illness in 1984, his membership in risk groups and other relevant data. 34 On the other
hand, the judge stated that if the donor was alive, the trial court
should ascertain appropriate means of providing Snyder with re13 5
quired information while maximizing the donor's protection.
Judge Pressler concluded that Snyder was entitled to limited discovery6 in his effort to seek redress from those who injured
him.

13

In an informative concurrence, Justice Pollock of the New
Jersey Supreme Court supplemented Judge Pressler's reasoning. 1 7 The justice wrote to accentuate the court's reliance upon
38
balancing the competing interests under section 26:5C-9(a).
Justice Pollock noted that, without legislative guidance, other
state courts were divided on the donor discovery issue. 3 9 The
131 Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. at 296, 582 A.2d at 314. The statute stated that
"[u]pon the granting of the order, the court, in determining the extent to which a
disclosure of all or any part of a record is necessary, shall impose appropriate safeguards to prevent an unauthorized disclosure." § 26:5C-9(a).
132 Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. at 296, 582 A.2d at 314-15.
133 Id. at 296-97, 582 A.2d at 315.
134 Id. at 296, 582 A.2d at 315. The judge also acknowledged that the personal
representative of the deceased donor must be apprised of these proceedings. Id.
'35 Id. at 296-97, 582 A.2d at 315. Specifically, Judge Pressler suggested that the
donor's identity could be kept confidential through the use of a "veiled" deposition
or written interrogatories. Id. at 297, 582 A.2d at 315.
136 Id. The judge highlighted that Snyder had only asserted claims against parties
who stood protectively between himself and the blood donor. Id. The judge further recognized the degree of Snyder's injury and the urgent need for the information sought. Id.
137 Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 N.J. 328, 329-30, 593 A.2d 318, 319 (1991) (Pollock,

J., concurring).
138 Id. at 330, 593 A.2d at 319 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock emphasized balancing the blood donor's privacy interest, Snyder's interest in meaningful
discovery and compensation for injuries suffered, and society's interest in the blood
supply system. Id.
139 Id. at 333, 593 A.2d 320-21 (Pollock, J., concurring). Some courts have denied discovery. See, e.g., Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 363 (E.D.
Mich. 1990) (discovery denied due to society's interest in an adequate and ample
supply of blood); Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D.
Ga. 1990) (court denied discovery because of the donor's privacy interests); Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Serv., 125 F.R.D. 646, 657 (D.S.C. 1989) (society's in-
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justice, however, quickly noted that the New Jersey courts were
guided by the AIDS Assistance Act.' 40 The concurring justice
recognized that, in the past, the high court deferred to legislation
in bioethical questions.' 4 ' Accordingly, the justice noted that
terest in an adequate volunteer blood supply system and the donor's privacy interest outweigh permitting discovery); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500
So.2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1987) (the donor's privacy interest and society's interest in a
volunteer blood donation system precluded enforcing a subpoena duces tecum requiring the blood bank to furnish the victim with donor names and addresses);
Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So.2d 1381, 1384-85 (La. 1990) (the
potentially adverse effect on the volunteer blood donation system prevented disclosure of donor names and addresses); Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475,
476 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (the physician-patient privilege statute precluded an order
granting discovery); Taylor v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 186 (C.P.
1987) (court prevented discovery because of the adverse effect on the nation's
blood supply system).
Other courts, however, have permitted discovery. See, e.g., Boutte v. Blood Sys.
Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989) (discovery was permitted to promote
justice and increase the standards of the nation's blood supply system); Mason v.
Regional Med. Ctr., 121 F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (blood donor's privacy
rights did not preclude discovery of blood donor information); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1009, 1013 (Colo. 1988) (physician-patient privilege and other statutes held inapplicable, and the victim's interest
outweighed the donor's right of privacy); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563
A.2d 531, 537, 539 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (physician-patient privilege was inapplicable and the donor's privacy right would not be violated by granting discovery),
appeal granted, 577 A.2d 891 (1990); Gulf Coast Regional Blood Ctr. v. Houston,
745 S.W.2d 557, 559-61 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (court order granting discovery did
not violate the donor's right to privacy and no other privileges existed to preclude
disclosure).
The concurring justice further acknowledged that commentators were also
split on blood donor discovery conflicts. Snyder, 125 N.J. at 333, 593 A.2d at 321
(Pollock, J., concurring). See, e.g., Turkington, supra note 40, at 907-08 (granting
discovery does not necessarily impinge upon the blood donor privacy rights); Andresen, supra note 40, at 586-87 (ordering disclosure would not violate a blood
donor's right to privacy and a plaintiff's interest in pursuing meaningful discovery
weigh in favor of discovery) Robert K. Jenner, Identifying HIV-Infected Blood Donors,
TRIAL, June 1989, at 47, 53 (permitting discovery results in a safer blood supply by
discouraging high risk people from donating); Maria S. Kirsh, Note, AIDS: Anonymity in Donation Situations-Where Public Benefit Meets Private Good, 69 B.U. L. REv. 187,
211-12 (1989) (granting donor discovery would conflict with the donor's right to
privacy and society's interest in a safe and adequate blood supply); Bollow & Lapp,
supra note 40, at 374-75 (ordering blood donor discovery would contravene the
physician-patient privilege, the donor's privacy rights, and the preservation of an
adequate blood supply system).
140 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 334, 593 A.2d at 321 (Pollock, J., concurring). See supra
notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
141 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 335, 593 A.2d at 321-22 (Pollock,,J., concurring) (citing In
re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 NJ. 365, 529 A.2d
419 (1987); In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976)). The justice recognized that this case posed questions of competing legal and ethical concerns. Id. at 335, 593 A.2d at 321 (Pollock, J., concurring).
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resolution of the issue required application of section 26:5C-9(a),
and an inquiry into its potential conflict with a blood donor's
1 42
constitutional privacy rights.
Justice Pollock scrutinized the physician-patient privilege using section 26:5C-9(a)'s balancing test.143 The justice articulated
that for the privilege to apply, the communication between a
blood bank and donor must pertain to diagnosis and treatment. 1 44 The concurring justice emphasized that an individual's
blood donation benefitted another and thus did not involve any
diagnosis or treatment within the statute's meaning. 1 45 The justice, therefore, dismissed application of the physician-patient
146
privilege to blood donations.
Justice Pollock then proceeded to weigh the blood donor's
privacy interests with the need for information. 14 7 Initially, the
justice recognized the unique stigma placed upon persons testing
HIV-positive and those with AIDS. ' 48 The concurring justice explained that because the HIV virus was transmitted through drug
The concurring justice then considered the appropriate roles courts and legislators
should assume when considering these concerns. Id. Justice Pollock pointed out
that as an elected representative body, the legislature was better equipped than the
judiciary to balance competing values. Id. The justice, however, perceived that
when the legislature is silent, thejudiciary could still resolve conflicts predicated on
constitutional ights or the common law. Id. Finally, Justice Pollock stressed that
even in situations where the legislature had acted, courts could scrutinize legislation to determine whether it abridged constitutional rights or supplemented common law rights. Id.
142 Id. at 336, 593 A.2d at 322 (Pollock, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 336-37, 593 A.2d at 322 (Pollock, J., concurring). The relevant portion
of the New Jersey physician-patient privilege statute stated:
[A person] has a privilege ... to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a
witness from disclosing, a communication, if he claims the privilege
and the judge finds that (a) the communication was a confidential
communication between patient and physician, and (b) the patient or
the physician reasonably believed the communication to be necessary
or helpful to enable the physician to make a diagnosis of the condition
of the patient or to prescribe or render treatment therefor ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1976).
144 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 337, 593 A.2d at 322-23 (Pollock, J., concurring).
145 Id., 593 A.2d at 323 (Pollock, J., concurring).
146 Id. at 338, 593 A.2d at 323 (Pollock, J., concurring). The supreme court justice noted that the majority of courts scrutinizing the identical issue were in accord
with his decision. Id. at 337, 593 A.2d at 323 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing Belle
Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988); Laburre
v. EastJefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So.2d 1381 (La. 1990); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr.,
563 A.2d 531 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal granted, 577 A.2d 891 (1990); Tarrant
County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)).
147 Id. at 338, 593 A.2d at 323 (Pollock, J., concurring).
148 Id. The justice stated that "no disease in modern history has engendered so
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use and sexual contact, the privacy needs of the donor regarding
these matters normally precluded discovery. 49 Justice Pollock,
however, opined that various factors, including the absence of a
much attention, fear, and even hysteria as AIDS." Id. Justice Pollock noted that
HIV-positive individuals are frequently ostracized. Id.
Other courts have similarly characterized the social impact of HIV and AIDS
on victims. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 902
(D.V.I. 1991) ("to conclude that persons with AIDS or HIV are stigmatized is an
understatement; they are widely stereotyped as indelibly miasmic, untouchable,
physically and morally polluted"); South Fla. Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d
798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("AIDS is the modern day equivalent of leprosy.
AIDS, or a suspicion of AIDS, can lead to discrimination in employment, education,
housing and even medical treatment"), aff'd, 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Doe v.
Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (noting not only the social stigma attached with AIDS carriers, but also emphasizing that "the psychological impact of
learning that one is [HIV-positive] . . .has been compared to receiving a death
sentence"); see generally Warren R. Janowitz, Safety of the Blood Supply, 9J. Legal Med.
611, 611 (1988) (describing the AIDS epidemic as a "modern day biblical plague").
For further illustrations of the stigma and hysteria HIV infection and AIDS
provokes see, e.g., Chalk v. United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir.
1988) (teacher with AIDS was relieved of teaching duties by the school district);
Poffv. Caro, 228 N.J. Super. 370, 373, 549 A.2d 900, 901 (Law. Div. 1987) (landlord declined renting an apartment to three gay men because of fear of AIDS); Gail
Appleson, Litigation Imminent on AIDS Issues, NAT'L LJ., July 25, 1983, at 3 (police
officers, in some California cities, demanded rubber gloves and masks be used
when handling gay men); David M. Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, A.B.A.J.,June
1986, at 36, 40 (Florida judge required AIDS victims to wear masks in his courtroom); John Parry, AIDS as a HandicappingCondition, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILry L. REP. 402, 402 (1985) (Los Angeles paramedics refused prompt assistance to
a heart attack victim because they believed the individual had AIDS); Amy Tarr,
AIDS: The Legal Issues Widen, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 1 (as of 1985, children
suffering from AIDS had been precluded access to schools in Connecticut, Denver,
Georgia, Indiana, and New Jersey); AIDS Spreads to the Courts, NEWSWEEK, July 1,
1985, at 61 (healthy gay men reporting to work with skin rashes or common colds
were being fired because of AIDS phobia); Ted Gest, As Cases Mount: AIDS Triggers
Painful Legal Battles, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1986, at 73 (Michigan police filed attempted murder charges against an AIDS victim who spat on four officers); John Holusha, A Gauntlet Against Contamination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990,
§ 3, at 10 (E. I. du Pont de Nemours offered surgical gloves manufactured with
Kevlar, a substantial ingredient in bullet-proof vests, to nurses and doctors concerned about contracting HIV and AIDS); Stephen Koepp, Living with AIDS on the
Job, TIME, Aug. 25, 1986, at 48 (AIDS victim's co-workers refused to use a truck
previously driven by the victim and threatened to kill the victim should he return to
work after a leave of absence) (lawsuit settled, Cronan v. New England Telephone,
No. 80332 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986)); Myra MacPherson, The Children and the Flames of
Fear, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 11, 1987, at BI (family residing in Florida whose
hemophiliac children tested HIV-positive had their house firebombed and were
chased out of town); Reginald Stewart, Haitians, Seeking Freedom and Jobs Find Heartaches Instead in America, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1983, at A18 (Haitians were not hired
because of fear of AIDS); Undertakers' Unit Warns of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1983, at A27 (funeral directors were encouraged not to embalm the corpses of
AIDS victims).
149 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 338, 593 A.2d at 323 (Pollock, J., concurring).
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confidentiality guarantee from the blood bank and the trial
judge's ability to limit discovery, vitiated the donor's privacy interest.' 50 Furthermore, the justice dismissed arguments suggesting that donor discovery may detrimentally affect the
volunteer blood bank system' 5 ' as speculative. 5 2 Justice Pollock,
therefore, explained that both the balancing test of section
26:5C-9(a) and Snyder's need to question the donor favored limited disclosure in which the trial court placed limited controls on
discovery. 153 Specifically, the justice noted that the statute gave
weight to society's interest in indemnifying individuals for the
negligence of others 154 and that Snyder needed limited disclo1 55
sure to prove his case.

Justice Pollock next analyzed the blood donor's constitutional right to privacy. 156 The concurring justice pointed out that
the United States Supreme Court has recognized two constitu150 Id. Specifically, Justice Pollock explained that BCBC made no guarantees of
confidentiality to this particular donor. Id. Also, Justice Pollock reiterated Judge
Pressler's suggested limitations on discovery. Id. at 339, 593 A.2d at 323-24. (Pollock, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. 281, 296-97, 582
A.2d 307, 315 (App. Div. 1990)). See supra note 135.
151 Id. at 339-40, 593 A.2d at 324. (Pollock,J., concurring). The defendants contended that discovery would discourage blood donations and lead to dishonest answers in questionnaire screening procedures, thereby enhancing the danger of
donating infected blood. Id. at 339, 593 A.2d at 324 (Pollock, J., concurring).
152 Id. at 340, 593 A.2d at 324. (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice noted that
no studies or statistics corroborated the defendant's assertions. Id. Moreover, Justice Pollock perceived that persons most likely to be disinclined from donating
blood would be those who are members of high-risk groups or already infected. Id.
153 Id. at 340-42, 593 A.2d at 324-25. (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice
stressed that a complete denial of discovery could undermine the pursuit of facts in
civil litigation. Id. at 341, 593 A.2d at 325. (Pollock, J., concurring). The concurring justice further emphasized that the goals of tort law to discourage negligence
and compensate injured persons could also be subverted. Id.
154 Id. at 340, 593 A.2d at 324. (Pollock, J., concurring) Justice Pollock stated,
"[a]lthough [§ 26:5C-9(a)] does not define 'public interest,' the phrase encompasses society's interest in compensating victims injured by the negligence of
others. A corollary to that interest is the right to full discovery." Id.
155 Id. at 340-41, 593 A.2d at 324-25. (Pollock, J., concurring). In stating this,
Justice Pollock applauded and extensively quoted Judge Pressler's opinion which
discussed the plaintiff's need for discovery in the instant case. Id. (quoting Snyder
v. Mekhjian, 244 NJ. Super. 281, 294-95, 582 A.2d 307, 314 (App. Div. 1990)).
The concurring justice also pointed out that Snyder had not requested the donor's
name and address. Id. at 341, 593 A.2d at 325. (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice
Pollock perceived that without a showing of specific need, discovering the donor's
identity would probably contravene the statute. Id. at 341-42, 593 A.2d at 325.
(Pollock, J., concurring). The justice recognized that less intrusive procedures,
such as written interrogatories or a "veiled" deposition would be proper. Id. at 342,
593 A.2d at 325 (Pollock, J., concurring).
156 Id.
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tional rights of privacy: autonomy and confidentiality. 157 Stating
that this case involved only confidentiality, Justice Pollock emphasized the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to nullify
a statute for infringing upon this right.' 58 Thus, the justice noted
that, if section 25:5C-9(a) was reasonable, a constitutional challenge of infringement on one's privacy rights by the statute
would fail.' 59
Justice Pollock further observed that federal appeals courts
have similarly refused to find that disclosure laws violate fundamental rights." 6 The justice observed that several of these
courts have used a balancing test to scrutinize privacy interests. 16 1 The concurring justice also distinguished recent district
court decisions that found violations of constitutional privacy interests where the state made unlimited disclosures of the victim's
identity and where the disclosures did not serve any government
2
6

interests.1

157 Id. The justice defined autonomy as "'the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions.'" Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 (1977)). Furthermore, the court noted that autonomy is limited to specific
fundamental rights such as contraception, marriage, family relationships, child
rearing, and education." Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)). The concurring justice defined confidentiality
as " 'the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.' " Id. (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599). Justice Pollock noted that governmental interference
in these areas could only be justified upon the showing of a compelling interest. Id.
(citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56).
158 Id. at 342-43, 593 A.2d at 325-26 (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice noted
that the Supreme Court analyzed an individual's confidentiality interest only three
times during the past fifteen years and never invalidated the statute at issue. Id. at
342, 593 A.2d at 325. See Nixon v. Adminstrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 48384 (1977) (a federal statute which mandates archivist to study presidential documents, even personal ones, was constitutional); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06 (New
York statute authorizing compilation of a computer database containing names and
addresses of individuals obtaining prescription drugs from doctors was not unconstitutional); Paul, 424 U.S. at 713-14 (state can publicize records of official acts,
including arrests).
159 Id. at 343, 593 A.2d at 326 (Pollock, J., concurring). See 2 RONALD D. RoTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITuTIONAL LAw § 18.30, at 605 (3d ed. 1986) (noting that governmental activity pertaining to collection and distribution of
information, unless impairing first amendment rights or constitutional limits on the
criminal justice system, need only be reasonable).
160 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 344, 593 A.2d at 326. (Pollock, J., concurring).
161 Id. (citing Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575
F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979)). See also supra note 39
and accompanying text.
162 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 344-45, 593 A.2d at 326-27 (Pollock,J., concurring) (citing
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988) aft'd, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.
1990); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990)). In Woods,
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In closing, Justice Pollock distinguished his position from
Justice Garibaldi's dissenting opinion. 163 The concurring justice
first posited that Justice Garibaldi should not have substituted
her own analysis for that provided in section 26:5C-9(a). 64 Justice Pollock then proceeded to disagree with the dissent's proposition that discovery should be denied because Snyder could not
currently prove defendant's negligence. 165 Justice Pollock
stressed that the purpose of discovery was to help parties ascertain facts relevant to the alleged negligence. 66 Finally, Justice
Pollock reiterated that Snyder's discovery request was not an attempt to hold the donor liable for his medical condition. 67 Accordingly, the justice found that 68Snyder was entitled to limited
discovery from the blood donor.

In a sympathetic dissent, Justice Garibaldi declared that disclosure was inappropriate in the instant case but acknowledged
that access to donor information would be proper in rare
cases. 169 Thejustice first observed that the court must balance a
litigant's need for data against the intrusiveness of discovery
prison medical staff revealed to non-medical staff and inmates that the plaintiff, a
prisoner, had tested HIV-positive. 689 F. Supp. at 874-75. In denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court found that no important governmental interest was served by defendants' discussion of plaintiff's medical
condition. Id. at 876. The court stressed that, although a prisoner, the plaintiff had
a right to privacy concerning his medical records. Id. For a discussion of Doe, see
supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
Justice Pollock emphasized that, although the Woods and Doe courts found that
disclosure of one's infection with HIV violated the person's privacy right, these
cases did not involve limited disclosure under the guidelines of a statute. Snyder,
125 N.J. at 345, 593 A.2d at 327 (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice also stated
that the factual circumstances of these federal district court decisions illustrated no
important public or governmental interest. Id. Consequently, Justice Pollock rejected the outcome in these courts and found that § 26:5C-9a provided sufficient
protection of a blood donor's privacy interest to withstand a constitutional challenge. Id.
163 Id. at 346, 593 A.2d at 327 (Pollock, J., concurring).
164 Id. The justice objected to the dissent's categorization of § 26:5C-9(a) as just
one of several factors in its analysis. Id. Justice Pollock explained that, because the
legislature is a co-equal governmental branch, the court is required to follow the
analysis set forth by the legislature in the statute. Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. The justice emphasized that this goal of discovery would be undermined
should a plaintiff have to prove negligence before sending interrogatories and taking depositions. Id.
167 Id. Thejustice pointed out that during oral argument, the plaintiff had stated
his intent not to hold the donor liable. Id.
168 Id. at 347, 593 A.2d at 328 (Pollock, J., concurring).
169 Id. at 350, 593 A.2d at 330 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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upon the other party. 170 The dissenting justice highlighted the
donor's health, the financial burdens of hiring an attorney and
the effect on immediate family members as relevant factors in analyzing the donor's burden.' 7 '
Justice Garibaldi then recognized the importance of the statutory framework protecting the confidentiality of people testing
HIV-positive. 172 The justice noted that other courts with similar
rules have rejected identical discovery requests. 173 Hence, injustice Garibaldi's view, a trial court must find a compelling reason
174
to substantiate a limited discovery order.
Justice Garibaldi next pointed to the probative value of the
information sought to be discovered. 175 The justice observed
that because HIV blood testing became reliable and routine in
1985, the time period for litigation in this area dates back six or
more years. 176 Justice Garibaldi, therefore, posited that even
favorable discovery may be of little value if the factfinder's confi170 Id. at 351, 593 A.2d at 330 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing In re W.C., 85
N.J. 218, 426 A.2d 50 (1981)).
171 Id. Thejustice pointed out that the donor, if alive, is likely to be very ill, and
that the burden of discovery will thus be magnified. Id. Justice Garibaldi noted that
in New Jersey, 90% of the individuals diagnosed with AIDS in 1985 are now deceased, and that approximately 70% of those persons diagnosed in 1988 have also
died. Id.
172 Id. at 351-52, 593 A.2d at 330 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing the AIDS
Assistance Act, §§ 26:5C-6.5 to -9). The justice emphasized that even provisions
expressly permitting disclosure of HIV or AIDS case medical records were extremely narrow. Id. (citing § 26:5C-8). Justice Garibaldi also discussed the denial of
a discovery motion under N.J. CT. R. 4:10-3. Id. at 352, 593 A.2d at 330-31 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The rule stated that "[ulpon motion by a party or by the
person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court may
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ..
" N.J. CT. R. 4:10-3.
'73 Id. at 352-53, 593 A.2d at 331 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Coleman v.
American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Doe v. American Red
Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood
Serv., Inc., 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555
So.2d 1381 (La. 1990); Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1987);
Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Taylor v.
West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (C.P. 1987)). Justice Garibaldi opined that
courts that have permitted discovery determined either that the data was essential
to the cause of action or evidence showed some wrongdoing on the part of the
blood bank or donor. Snyder, 125 N.J. at 354-55, 593 A.2d at 331-32 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting) (citing Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d
1003 (Colo. 1988); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987)).
174 Id. at 355, 593 A.2d at 332 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
175 Id.
176 Id.
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dence in the donor's ability to recall is low. 1 77 The dissenting

justice emphasized that evidentiary concerns were an important
factor to consider, especially when a person's privacy rights were
involved. 17 Additionally, Justice Garibaldi recognized that permitting discovery may lead to a lawsuit by the plaintiff against the
79

donor. 1

Justice Garibaldi further noted the substantial danger to society's interest should discovery be granted. 80 The dissenting
justice emphasized that confidentiality was the cornerstone of the
voluntary blood donation process.' 8' Accordingly, the justice
found blood donor 8anonymity
central to assuring a safe and suffi2
cient blood supply.'
In conclusion,Justice Garibaldi opined that discovery should
be granted only upon proving a compelling need, showing a reasonable probability that the information sought existed and exhausting all alternative means to gain the data. 8 3 The dissenting
justice also posited that the blood bank should inform the infected donor of the lawsuit and discovery request to provide the
donor with an opportunity to voluntarily comply.' 84 Finally, Justice Garibaldi asserted that even upon showing a compelling
need, any court-ordered disclosure must maximize the blood do177

Id.

Id. at 356, 593 A.2d at 332 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing State v. R.W., 104
NJ. 14, 514 A.2d 1287 (1986)). Specifically, the justice stated that Snyder must
show that an order compelling discovery would likely result in material evidence. Id.
at 355-56, 593 A.2d at 332 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 356, 593 A.2d at 332 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
charged that a plaintiff's attempt to obtain discovery may actually be an avenue -to
cast a broad net to expose the liability of any party in the donation process and to
create the basis for an additional lawsuit against the donor." Id.
180 Id. The dissenting justice saw the removal of confidentiality as having a chilling effect on potential blood donors. Id., 593 A.2d at 332-33 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
181 Id. at 356, 593 A.2d at 332 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi explained that confidentiality is important because highly personalized data is accumulated from donors during the screening process. Id. Further, the justice
emphasized that courts should be wary of creating precedent which causes a disincentive to donate. Id. at 356-57, 592 A.2d at 333 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 357, 593 A.2d at 333 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Doe v. American
Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 653 (D.S.C. 1989)).
183 Id. at 359, 593 A.2d at 334 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). The justice further perceived that parties would rarely be able to prove a compelling need, as well as justification, for donor discovery. Id.
184 Id. The dissenting justice recognized that upon learning about the lawsuit
and discovery request, the blood donor may waive privacy protection and answer a
plaintiff's request. Id.
178
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V.

CONCLUSION

The court in Snyder clearly acknowledged the tragic circum86
stances underlying blood transfusion-related AIDS litigation.'
Unfortunately, as the number of individuals contracting HIV infection through blood transfusion continues to swell, courts will
frequently be confronted with this issue. 187 Hence, it is essential
to lay a foundation of guidelines for courts to follow. The Snyder
court properly delineated the factors set forth in section 26:5C9(a)' 8 8 and arrived at the correct ruling.
Physician-patient privilege statutes cannot be extended to information exchanged between blood banks and donors. To invoke the privilege, a patient must consult a physician for
diagnosis and treatment.' 89 Initially, a blood donor may never
speak with a licensed physician and the privilege, generally, does
not apply to nurses.' 90 More importantly, it is clear that a donor
has not sought consultation from the blood bank for diagnosis
and treatment. Instead, the blood donor has aided the treatment
of a third person rather than oneself. Put simply, extending the
treatment of the blood recipient to the donor is without legal
foundation. Accordingly, the information exchanged between
blood-gathering organizations and donors cannot comport with
statutory requirements for the physician-patient privilege to preclude discovery.
Permitting limited disclosure will not curtail public support
for the nation's all-volunteer blood supply system. To assert that
fear of identification and questioning in future litigation will deter donors is moot. Current blood screening tests for the HIV
185 Id. The dissenting justice enunciated that courts must be extremely wary
when granting disclosure because of the various complexities involved with AIDSrelated discovery conflicts. Id.
186 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 346-47, 593 A.2d at 327-28 (Pollock, J., concurring); Id. at
358, 593 A.2d at 333-34 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
187 FRANCES J. DUNSTON, NEW JERSEY STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, NEW JERSEY: A
STATE ORGANIZING To FIGHT AIDS 18 (1991) (recommendations of the State Commissioner of Health to GovernorJim Florio). Cumulative AIDS case infections projected for New Jersey in 1992 indicated that 17,400 persons may have HIV or
AIDS. Id. Approximately 783 (or 4.5%) of the individuals in this estimate could
represent blood transfusion-related transmission. See id.
188 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
189 EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98, at 244 (3d ed. 1984).

190 Id. at 250 n.7. See also STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 345 (1984) (stating
that, in general, the physician-patient privilege is not applicable to communication
exchanged between a nurse and patient).

1032

SETON HALL L,4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:999

virus are over 99% accurate.' 9' Such a high degree of accuracy
means, in effect, that virtually all HIV contaminated blood will be
9 2
diverted from the blood supply system at the time of donation.'
Therefore, the present threat of litigation and questioning is low.
Additionally, to contend that confidentiality underpins the
volunteer blood donation system is fallacious. It is mere speculation and conjecture to state that blood donors predicate their decision to donate upon confidentiality. 193 Many, if not all, blood
donors see their donation as an altruistic deed. In fact, blood
banks frequently utilize generosity and humanitarian themes in
attempting to increase donation. 19 4 Hence, other more important factors influence a person's volition to donate.
In short, some people may stop donating. Individuals who
discontinue donating, however, will most likely be those who fit
into high-risk groups. 19 5 Consequently, blood donor disclosure
can have a positive effect on the overall donor pool by increasing
the quality of donated blood.
The disclosural right to privacy must be recognized for what
it is: a weak extension of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a privacy right. There is no universal constitutional right to privacy.' 9 6 Rather, a right to privacy has only been
applied to specific constitutional guarantees. The United States
Supreme Court has limited extension of the right to privacy to
areas of fundamental importance: marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education.' 97
191 See supra note 21. ELISA and Western Blot blood screening tests for the HIV
virus are typically described as "extremely accurate." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 80 (1988).
192 NEW JERSEY STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

DOING THE RIGHT THING:

AIDS 4 (1989) (report issued by the Department of Education as
a guide to local school districts for putting into effect AIDS education). The New
Jersey State Department of Education has acknowledged that "screening of all
blood donations has greatly reduced the chance of [HIV] infection from a blood transfusion." Id. (emphasis added).
193 See, e.g., Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 N.J. 328, 340, 593 A.2d 318, 324 (1991)
(Pollock, J., concurring) (noting that no study or statistics had been performed to
support an assertion that confidentiality encouraged a person to donate); Stenger v.
Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (stating "[wie
can perceive of no correlation between . . . [donor discovery] and a reduced
number of blood donations ....
), appeal granted, 577 A.2d 891 (Pa. 1990).
194 New York Blood Center, Leaflet No. x-862, Don't Forget the Gift of Life. Give
Blood.
195 Snyder, 125 N.J. at 340, 593 A.2d at 324 (Pollock, J., concurring); see Jenner,
supra note 139, at 53.
196 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
197 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
TEACHING ABOUT
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Further, the Court has never upheld the disclosural right to privacy. 9 8 Decisions extending the disclosural privacy right to the
medical, drug use and sexual histories of blood donors are not
easily reconciled with the Court's reasoning in analyzing this interest. 19 9 Hence, predicating non-disclosure upon a constitu-

tional right to privacy is a tenuous argument.
Finally, an individual's concern in pursuing meaningful discovery during litigation must be given the attention it deserves.
If donor discovery is essential to a cause of action, it would contravene the goals of civil litigation and tort law to deny the request. 200 It is a person's common law right to bring an action
against an offending party and this guarantee should not be abrogated by a procedural impediment. The rules of discovery recognize the need to obtain relevant facts. 20 1 Further, it is settled law
20 2
that discovery rules are given broad and liberal treatment.
Most importantly, courts have wide discretion in molding the
form and scope of discovery. In cases like Snyder, the names of
the blood donors can be protected and the form of questioning
can be controlled. Accordingly, the right to seek redress against
another at law should not be obstructed.
In sum, the reality of William Snyder's situation illustrates
the fact that HIV infection and AIDS do not differentiate among
their victims. 2 ° s The contraction of the HIV virus through blood
198 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
199 See id.

200 See supra note 5 (noting that most state statutes preclude a cause of action in
strict liability or breach of warranty and allow for recovery only in negligence).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). See also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
202 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176-77 (1979) (the discovery rules
201

are to be given broad and liberal treatment and in some cases, superseding even
the First Amendment privilege of freedom of the press); Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment").
203 See, e.g., Martha M. Curley, Note, EstablishingRelieffor the Most Innocent of All
AIDS Victims: Liabilityfor PerinatalTransmission of AIDS, 28 J. FAM. L. 271 (1990) (dis-

cussing potential legal theories of recovery for infants who contract HIV while in
utero); Peter Applebome, Dentist Dies of AIDS, Leaving Florida City Concerned but Calm,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1990, at II (Kimberly Bergalis claimed to have contracted the

HIV virus through common dental treatment from Dr. David J. Acer, who was suffering from AIDS); Chuck Conconi, Personalities, WASHINGTON POST, March 17,

1988, at D3 (John Holmes, a pornographic film star who claimed to have copulated
with 14,000 women, died from AIDS probably acquired during his movie encounters); Freddie Mercury 45, Lead Singer of the Rock Band Queen, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 25, 1991, at D12 (lead singer for a popular rock band during the 1970's died
from AIDS); Dirk Johnson, Ryan White Dies of AIDS at 18; His Struggle Helped Pierce

Myths, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1990, at D10 ( Ryan White, an eighteen year old hemophiliac boy who contracted the HIV virus through a blood transfusion and vigor-
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transfusions in the early 1980s, however, could have been minimized. Indeed, experts have noted that the initial response to
HIV contaminated blood by the blood bank industry was "unnecessarily slow." ' 20 4 Hence, the industry should be held to furnish
discovery in litigation concerning its inadequate attention to a
situation of monumental importance.
Lincoln A. Terzian
ously fought to be allowed to attend public schools died of AIDS); Richard W.
Stephenson, MagicJohnson Ends His Career, Saying He Has AIDS Infection, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1991, at A 1,B 12 (Ervin "Magic" Johnson, typically described as one of the
world's greatest athletes, suddenly retired from the Los Angeles Lakers of the National Basketball Association stating that he had acquired the HIV virus through
heterosexual contact).
204 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
CIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC

78 (1988).
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